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TO BARE OR NOT TO BARE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF LOCAL ORDINANCES BANNING NUDE SUNBATHING
Richard B. Kellam*
Teri Scott Lovelace**
One of America's favorite and most popular summertime activi-
ties is sunbathing. Millions of Americans enjoy this recreational
pastime each year.1 Sunbathing is a form of relaxation shared by
all people, regardless of economic or social status in society. In re-
cent years, the social nudism movement has grown and gained con-
siderable support. One statistic boasts that approximately thirty-
three million people have, at some time in their lives, engaged in
social nudism in one form or another. As a result of this growth,
nudist groups have become highly organized national associations
with local chapters throughout the country. It is through these na-
tional organizations that social nudism beliefs are being chan-
neled-particularly the right to sunbathe in the nude on public
beaches. Consequently, while nude sunbathing once was viewed as
an individual preference practiced in backyards, it is now a belief
which is being fostered by organized associations.
Recently, proponents of social nudism have expressed an inter-
est in public sunbathing.2 Social nudism advocates the right, if one
* Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
** Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; law clerk to Judge Richard B.
Kellam (1985-86); B.A., 1982, University of Virginia; J.D., 1985, T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
1. There are 2.5 million overnight guests in Virginia Beach motels and hotels annually.
Approximately 1.5 million of these guests stay in local hotels and motels during the summer
months. Furthermore, it is estimated that there are over 100,000 day visitors, in addition to
the overnight guests, on a typical summer weekend in Virginia Beach. Telephone interview
with Jim Ricketts, Coordinator for Tourist Development in Virginia Beach (Oct. 17, 1985).
The Assateague Island National Seashore, which is owned by the federal government and
is located within Accomack County, Virginia, has approximately 1.5 million people per year
visit its seashore. Plaintiffs' complaint at 7, National Capital Naturist v. Board of Supervi-
sors, No. 85-452-Cir. (E.D. Va. filed June 25, 1985) [hereinafter NCN's Complaint].
2. See, e.g., NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, wherein National Capital Naturist (NCN)
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 25,
1985, challenging the constitutionality of the Accomack County ordinance which prohibits
nude sunbathing. NCN is a nonstock Virginia corporation incorporated in 1984, whose pur-
pose is to encourage and promote social nudism. NCN is the largest affiliated chapter of the
National Organization of Naturists.
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so desires, to go nude on public beaches, in parks and at recrea-
tional centers.' This nationwide movement promotes social nudism
as a wholesome and healthful life-style and seeks to educate the
public as to the spiritual benefits of naturism.4 Proponents of so-
cial nudism also advocate that the nude human form is a "physical
entity which is neither inherently obscene nor apt to cause erotic
stimulation in normal social . . . groups. ' 5
However, social nudism groups have met with resistance from
local authorities. Several localities in Virginia have enacted ordi-
nances which prohibit nude sunbathing on public beaches.6 These
Naturists claim that between one and two million people in the United States practice
social nudism. The Naturist chapters tend to be primarily located on both the east and west
coasts of the United States. Cf. infra note 3 (the American Sunbathing Association is lo-
cated primarily in Florida).
The Naturist growth began in 1931 when nudism was first introduced to the United
States from Germany. However, it was not until the early 1950's under the supervision of
Lee Baxendall, the founder of Modern Naturist, that the Naturist movement gained mo-
mentum. At that time the Naturist officially split with the American Sunbathing Associa-
tion, see infra note 3, and started their own organization. Since that time, the Naturist
movement and social nudism in general have grown to over one million active participants.
Telephone interview with John P. McGeehan, counsel for NCN (Oct. 31, 1985). According to
some statistics, over thirty-three million individuals have practiced social nudism in one
form or another. See infra note 3.
3. NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. Social nudism, as articulated by the Naturist,
must be distinguished from camp-type nudity which is promoted by the American Sun-
bathing Association (ASA). The ASA, whose national headquarters is in Kissimmee, Florida,
espouses a family-oriented style of nudism that encourages nudity in camp groups. The ASA
is the largest nudist group in the country, and currently there are over 200 clubs or resorts
in the United States and Canada. The ASA claims membership of over 30,000 people. The
ASA, like the Naturist, originated in 1931 when nudity moved to this country from Ger-
many. The ASA was originally called the American League for Physical Culture. This initial
nudist group was anti-drinking and anti-overeating. Unlike the Naturist, however, the ASA
did not advocate the option of nudity on public property, but instead adhered to camp-type
nudity. As a result of the cost of membership at nudity camps, the discrimination against
blacks and Jews at the camp, and the general conservative nature of nudity camps, the
Naturist split from the ASA in the early 1950's. See supra note 2. As a result of this split,
there are currently two social groups advocating different types of nudist practices. In 1984,
the ASA formed a Free Beach Committee which, like the Naturist, advocates the right to be
nude on public beaches. Consequently, the two groups are less in conflict with one another
and are now both promoting the right to nude sunbathing. Telephone interview with Arne
Eriksen, Executive Director, American Sunbathing Association (Oct. 31, 1985); telephone
interview with John P. McGeehan, counsel for NCN (Oct. 31, 1985).
In Virginia there are four ASA resorts or clubs: Forest City Lodge in Melton; Maple
Glenn in Sheldon; National Capital Sun Club in Leesburg; and Blue Ridge Bares in Roa-
noke. Telephone interview with Arne Eriksen, Executive Director, ASA (Oct. 31, 1985).
4. NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., AccOMACK COUNTY, VA. ORDINANCES § 9.3 (1984):
WHEREAS, the governing body of a county, pursuant to the provisions of Section
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laws prescribe criminal sanctions for their violation, and in most
15.1-510 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, may adopt such measures as it
may deem expedient to secure and promote the health, safety, and general welfare of
the inhabitants; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Supervisors of Accomack County deems it necessary to
prohibit certain conduct as herein proscribed in order to secure and promote the
health, safety and general welfare of the inhabitants
(A) As used in this Ordinance, "state of nudity" means a state of undress so as to
expose the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full
opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple.
(B) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally
appear in public, or in a public place, or in a place open to the public or open to
public view, in a state of nudity or to employ, encourage or procure another person to
so appear.
(C) Nothing contained in this Ordinance shall be construed to apply to the exhibi-
tion, presentation, showing or performance of any play, ballet, drama, concert hall,
museum of fine arts, school, institution of higher learning or other similar establish-
ment which is primarily devoted to such exhibitions, presentations, shows or perform-
ances as a form of expression of opinion, communication, speech, ideas, information,
art or drama, as differentiated from commercial or business advertising, promotion or
explication of nudity for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling or serving
products or services or otherwise advancing the economic welfare of a commercial or
business enterprise, such as a hotel, motel, bar, nightclub, restaurant, tavern or dance
hall.
(D) Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall be guilty of a Class
1 misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by confinement in jail
for not more than twelve (12) months and a fine of not more than One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000), either or both.
(E) Should any section, paragraph, sentence, clause or phrase of this Ordinance be
declared unconstitutional or invalid for any reason, the remainder of this Ordinance
shall not be affected thereby.
(F) The provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to all areas of Accomack County,
including within any incorporated town.
(G) The effective date of this Ordinance shall be upon adoption by the Board of
Supervisors of Accomack County.
(H) The provisions hereof shall be enforced by the Accomack County Sheriff's Of-
fice, Conservators of the Peace, Special Conservators of the Peace, Policemen and
Special Policemen appointed pursuant to the provisions of Sections 19.2-12 to -24
and Sections 15.1-144 to -159.7 of the Code of Virginia so designated.
The City of Richmond, Virginia, in response to nude and topless sunbathing on the banks of
the James River, enacted in August, 1985, Ordinance No. 85-202-195. The ordinance
amended the Code of the City of Richmond by adding in Chapter 20, Article VI, Division 2,
new section number 20-102.20. The new ordinance reads as follows:
Sec. 20-102.20. Public nudity; Class 1 misdemeanor; punishment.
(a) As used in this section, "state of nudity" means a state of undress so as to
expose the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a
fully opaque covering, or the showing of a female breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally
appear in public, or in a public place open to the public or open to public view, in a
state of nudity or to employ, encourage or procure another person to so appear.
(c) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to apply to the breastfeed-
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ing of infants or the exhibition, presentation, showing or performance of any play,
ballet, drama, tableau, production of motion picture in any theater, concert hall, mu-
seum of fine arts, school, institution of higher learning or other similar establishment
which is primarily devoted to such exhibitions, presentations, shows or performances
as a form of expression of opinion, communication, speech, ideas, information, art or
drama, as differentiated from commercial or business advertising, promotion or ex-
ploitation of nudity for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling or serving prod-
ucts or services or otherwise advancing the economic welfare of a commercial or busi-
ness enterprise, such as a hotel, motel, bar, nightclub, restaurant, tavern or dance
hall.
(d) Any person, upon conviction thereof, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor;
that is, by a fine not in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and by confinement
in jail for a period not to exceed twelve (12) months, either or both.
§ 2. This ordinance shall be in force and effect upon adoption.
RICHMOND, VA., CODE ch. 20, art. VI, § 20-102.20 (1985).
The City of Virginia Beach has also enacted an anti-nude sunbathing ordinance. VA.
BEACH, VA., CITY CODE § 6-19 (1981) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful and a Class 1 misdemeanor for any person not wearing a bath-
ing suit or other clothing to bathe in any lake, pond or in the Atlantic Ocean or
Chesapeake Bay within the City.
Closely related to Virginia Beach's nude sunbathing ordinance is its law which generally
prohibits public nudity. VA. BEACH, VA., CITY CODE § 22-10 (1981):
(a) As used in this section, "state of nudity" means a state of undress so as to
expose the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a
fully opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully
opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally
appear in public, or in a public place, or in a place open to the public or open to
public view, in a state of nudity or to employ, encourage or procure another person to
so appear.
(c) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to apply to the exhibition,
presentation, showing or performance of any play, ballet, drama, tableau, production
or motion picture in any theater, concert hall, museum of fine arts, school, institution
of higher learning or other similar establishment which is primarily devoted to such
exhibitions, presentations, shows, or performances as a form of expression of opinion,
communication, speech, ideas, information, art or drama, as differentiated from com-
mercial or business advertising, promotion or exploitation of nudity for the purpose
of advertising, promoting, selling or serving products or services or otherwise advanc-
ing the economic welfare of a commercial or business enterprise, such as a hotel,
motel, bar, nightclub, restaurant, tavern or dance hall.
Special attention should be given to § 22-10(c), which did not prohibit nudity in the fine
arts since it is a form of expression. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (nude
sunbathing as a form of expression). Likewise, the County of Henrico also has an ordinance
which prohibits nude sunbathing. HENRICO COUNTY, VA., CODE § 15-33 (1985) states:
(a) As used in this section, "state of nudity" means a state of undress so as to
expose the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks or to cover any of
them with less than fully opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast or any
portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the covering of the breast or any por-
tion thereof below the top of the nipple with less than a fully opaque covering.
(b) Every person who knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally appears in public or
any public place or in a place open to the public or open to public view in a state of
nudity or employs, encourages or procures another person so to appear, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by confinement in jail for not more than six (6)
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instances the penalty is a class one misdemeanor." Generally, the
ordinances make it unlawful for any person to bathe on public
beaches without wearing a bathing suit or other suitable clothing.s
The announced purpose of these ordinances is "to prohibit certain
conduct [public nudity] in order to secure and promote the health,
safety and general welfare of the inhabitants."
As a result of these local ordinances, social nudism groups claim
that they are being severely restricted from advocating their life-
style and beliefs. Consequently, social nudism proponents have
sought federal protection 0 by challenging the constitutional valid-
ity of the ordinances in federal courts, specifically alleging that the
months and a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), either or both.
(c) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to apply to the exhibition,
presentation, showing or performance of any play, ballet, drama, tableau, production
or motion picture in any theater, concert hall, museum of fine arts, school, institution
of higher learning or other similar establishment which is primarily devoted to such
exhibitions, presentations, shows or performances as a form of expression of opinion,
communication, speech, ideas, information, art or drama. (Ord. No. 596, § 1).
Although not prohibiting nude sunbathing, the Virginia Code does prohibit indecent ex-
posure. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-387 (Repl. Vol. 1982) states: "Every person who intentionally
makes an obscene display or exposure of his person, or the private parts thereof, in any
public place, or in any place where others are present, or procures another to so expose
himself, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor." See Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215
Va. 274, 208 S.E.2d 752 (1974) (indecent exposure statute was not vague or overbroad). See
generally Annotation, Criminal Offense Predicated Upon Indecent Exposure, 94 A.L.R.2D
1353 (1964).
7. See, e.g., VA. BEACH, VA., CrrY CODE § 6-19 (1981) (penalty for nude sunbathing is a
class one misdemeanor). A class one misdemeanor is defined as confinement in jail for not
more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $1,000, either or both. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
8. See supra note 6.
9. See NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 8. (Accomack Board of Supervisors enactment
of AccOM1ACK COUNTY, VA., ORDINANCES § 9.3 (1984)). The Board of Supervisors enacted the
local ordinance pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-510 (Repl. Vol. 1981), which permits a
locality to adopt such measures as it may deem expedient to secure and promote the health,
safety and general welfare of its inhabitants. But see NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 13
(challenging the ordinance as beyond the county's authority to enact). Under their police
power, localities may enact nudity ordinances if the governing body reasonably believes the
action be to contrary to the morals, health, safety and general welfare of the community.
KMA, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 228 Va. 365, 323 S.E.2d 78 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2324 (1985); Wall Distribs., Inc. v. City of Newport News, 228 Va. 358, 323 S.E.2d 75
(1984); Wayside Restaurant Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 215 Va. 231, 208 S.E.2d 51
(1974); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-389 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (the governing body is author-
ized to adopt ordinances to prohibit obscenity or conduct paralleling obscenity, provided
that the penalty does not exceed jail confinement of twelve months or a fine of $1,000).
10. See NCN's Complaint, supra note 1; see also South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of
Miami, 548 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 1984); Chapin v.
Town of Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F.
Supp. 122 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976).
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local laws infringe upon their first amendment rights and that the
ordinances are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
This article addresses the procedural obstacles involved in chal-
lenging the constitutionality of local ordinances which prohibit
nude sunbathing.11 It includes a discussion of the steps necessary
to bring the constitutional challenge in federal court.12 In addition,
the article explores the possible substantive constitutional chal-
lenges to these ordinances, including the first amendment right to
free speech and expression, 3 the first amendment right to free as-
sociation,14 and the fourteenth amendment right of personal lib-
erty.'5 Consideration also is given to the procedural constitutional
challenges to these ordinances, in particular the challenges of
vagueness'16 and overbreadth. 17 Finally, the article concludes with a
projection of how such Virginia ordinances will stand up under
federal scrutiny.' 8
I. PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF
LOCAL ORDINANCES
As with any suit brought in federal court, there are several pro-
cedural hurdles that must be overcome prior to an adjudication of
the constitutionality of local ordinances prohibiting nude sun-
bathing. These include the concepts of jurisdiction, venue, and
abstention.
First, the plaintiffs must allege particularized and immediate in-
jury which is sufficient to give them standing."9 Nude sunbathers
11. See infra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 26-27.
13. See infra notes 39-86 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 91-117 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 119-46 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 148-69 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 170-87 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
19. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 548 F. Supp. 53, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1982),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Steffel v. Thomp-
son, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, vacated and remanded, 414
U.S. 1035 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d
1202 (11th Cir.), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986); Kew v. Senter, 416 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Tex.
1976).
The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part standing test which requires the plaintiff
to show both that the challenged conduct has caused injury in fact and that the interest
sought to be protected is within the zone of interests to be protected by the constitutional
guarantee in question. See Association of Data Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
[Vol. 20:589
NUDE SUNBATHING
must specifically allege that they have suffered actual "injury in
fact." Merely asserting theoretical or ideological claims will not
suffice for standing. The recent case of National Capital Naturist
v. Board of Supervisors,0 filed in the Eastern District of Virginia,
involves a constitutional challenge to Accomack's local ordinance
prohibiting nude sunbathing and provides an excellent illustration
of the necessary prerequisites for standing to maintain such a suit.
The complaint and accompanying affidavits asserted that over "50
persons were arrested and criminally prosecuted for violations of
this ordinance. ' 21 In addition, one affiant asserted that he was
"fearful that his continued practice of his beliefs in the healthful
benefits of family social nudism [would] result in the criminal ar-
rest of himself and members of his family. 2 2 If the suit is brought
by an organization or association on behalf of its members,28 the
association need not show injury to itself, but only to its mem-
bers. 4 In National Capital Naturist, the suit was brought both by
individual defendants and by a nonstock Virginia corporation
whose purpose "is to encourage, to advocate and to promote social
nudism. '25 The corporation successfully acquired standing through
the use of affidavits demonstrating that its members had individu-
ally sustained some injury.
The second procedural hurdle requires an establishment of the
federal court's jurisdiction to hear the suit. When challenging the
constitutionality of a local ordinance, plaintiffs should seek declar-
atory26 as well as injunctive relief27-a declaration that the local
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW §§ 3-17 to -29 (1978); Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Ac-
tions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Be-
havioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. Rav. 479, 488-94 (1972).
20. NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
21. Id.
22. Affidavit of John D. Fitz-Gerald, NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
23. See, e.g., NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. (National Capital Naturist brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia); South Fla.
Free Beaches, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 53 (plaintiff brought action individually and in name of
South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc.).
24. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). To survive a standing challenge, the plaintiffs
must articulate the injury sustained.
25. NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1982). See generally Note, Recent Decisions, 41 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 374 (1972) (review of First Circuit case that held that a federal district court may
declare unconstitutional an ordinance which impairs first amendment freedom of expres-
sion, despite the failure of petitioners to show the degree of irreparable injury normally
required to justify intervention).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). See generally Comment, Federal Court Intervention in
1986] 595
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ordinance is invalid and an injunction preventing the enforcement
of the local statute.
The plaintiffs in National Capital Naturist sought both a de-
claratory judgment that the local ordinance of Accomack County
was unconstitutional and an injunction against future arrests and
prosecution by the local authorities. Although the court declined
jurisdiction by virtue of the abstention doctrine," the federal
courts do in fact have original jurisdiction to redress deprivations
of constitutional rights, including those which occur under the
color of state law or ordinance, 2  as well as the power to award
damages or equitable relief for the protection of those rights.30 To
date, however, no federal court has awarded any relief for alleged
constitutional rights violations under local ordinances banning
nude sunbathing.
The third procedural hurdle to overcome is the requirement of
proper venue. In a suit challenging the constitutionality of a local
ordinance, proper venue lies where all the defendants reside or
where the claim arose.31 Since the plaintiff will, in all likelihood, be
bringing suit against the local governing body and since the claim
must have arisen within the locality for the local ordinance to ap-
ply, venue is therefore proper in the federal district and division
where the municipality is located. The plaintiffs in National Capi-
tal Naturist sued the Board of Supervisors of Accomack County,
the commonwealth attorney for the county, and the local sheriff.
Pending State Criminal Prosecutions-The Significance of Younger v. Harris, 6 U. RICH. L.
REv. 347 (1971).
A preliminary injunction is issued to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury and to
preserve the court's power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits of the
case. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (1973 & Supp.
1985). The trial court has the discretion to either grant or deny the injunction. Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); see also First Citizens Bank & Trust v.
Camp, 432 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1970). There are several factors that the trial court considers
in evaluating the motion for an injunction. The factors include: (1) the threat of irreparable
harm to plaintiff if the injunction is not granted; (2) the balance of hardships between the
harm to the plaintiff in denying the injunction and the injury to the defendant in granting
the injunction; (3) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits of the case; and
(4) the public interest. See Allison v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1972); King v. Sad-
dleback Junior College Dist., 425 F.2d 426, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1970). See generally
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, §§ 2947-48 (discussing in detail the factors considered by
the trial judge in deciding whether or not to grant an injunction).
28. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (1982).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1977). See generally Korbel, The Law of Federal Venue and Choice
of the Most Convenient Forum, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 607, 609 (1961).
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Hence, venue was proper in the federal district where Accomack
County was situated.
Finally, the plaintiffs in National Capital Naturist encountered
what is possibly the most difficult obstacle to a constitutional chal-
lenge-the federal abstention doctrines. The court abstained from
deciding the constitutionality of Accomack's local ordinance
prohibiting nude sunbathing, finding that "the facts and circum-
stances of this case strongly suggest to the Court that it should
abstain and permit the state court to have the first opportunity to
deal with the challenged ordinance. 3 2 The court explained that
"the courts of Virginia have extensive familiarity and experience
with such matters [determining the constitutionality of local ordi-
nances] and we believe that they should have the initial opportu-
nity to pass upon them."3 3 Furthermore, the court suggested that a
state adjudication might avoid needless friction between the fed-
eral and state governments over the administration of purely state
affairs. 4 In addition, it was noted that the state court proceeding
would afford the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to raise the
constitutional issues asserted.35 Of particular importance to the
court was the fact that the challenged ordinance had not previ-
ously been addressed by the state court, as the opinion concluded
that matters of "first impression under state law should be re-
solved by the state courts."3 6
Under the abstention doctrines, 37 a federal district judge may
32. National Capital Naturists, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 85-452-N, slip op. at 3
(E.D. Va. July 12, 1985), reh'g denied, slip op. (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 1985) (mem.). A motion to
reconsider the district court's abstention in the case was denied on September 9, 1985. The
plaintiffs, on November 29, 1985, appealed the lower court's denial to reconsider its opinion
to abstain. This appeal was denied in National Capital Naturists, Inc. v. Board of Supervi-
sors, No. 85-1995 (4th Cir. July 7, 1986).
33. National Capital Naturists, Inc., No. 85-452-N, slip op. at 5 (quoting Fralin & Wal-
dron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1974)). To date, the plain-
tiffs have not filed this case in the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
34. National Capital Naturists, Inc., No. 85-452-N, slip op. at 5.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 7 (quoting North v. Budig, 637 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1981)).
37. There are four alternative forms of the abstention doctrine. The first and the most
often used doctrine is known as the "Pullman Abstention Doctrine," articulated in Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Under this doctrine, the federal court may, and
ordinarily should, refrain from deciding a case where state action is challenged as violating
the federal constitution if there are any unsettled questions of state law that may be dispos-
itive of the case. In other words, the state court should have the first opportunity to decide
its own law rather than allowing the federal courts to "forecast" state laws.
If a federal judge, using his discretion, abstains from deciding whether a local ordinance is
constitutional, the abstention will, in all probability, be based on the Pullman-type absten-
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abstain from hearing a case to avoid deciding a federal constitu-
tional question when the case may be disposed of on a question of
state law, to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a
state of its own affairs, to leave to the state the resolution of unset-
tled questions of state law, and to ease the congestion of the fed-
eral court docket.38 Since the application of the abstention doc-
trines is within the discretion of the district judge, there is no
guaranteed method of avoiding abstention by the court. As a re-
sult, plaintiffs challenging these local ordinances should be pre-
pared to argue that federal abstention is improper in such a case.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
If the procedural hurdles can be successfully negotiated, the fo-
cus then turns to substantive challenges regarding the constitu-
tionality of the municipal nudity ordinances. The available sub-
stantive challenges worthy of attention include the
unconstitutional infringement upon plaintiffs' first amendment
tion doctrine since the state courts should have the first opportunity to review the chal-
lenged ordinance in light of the state constitution. The Pullman doctrine thus avoids the
need to reach the federal constitutional question. See generally Field, Abstention in Consti-
tutional Cases; the Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071
(1974).
The second type of abstention is known as the "Buford Abstention Doctrine" and was
outlined in Buford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Under this second type of abstention, a
federal court will abstain in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a
state of its own internal affairs.
The third type of abstention is abstention in private litigation merely to avoid deciding
difficult questions of state law. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943);
see also County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). These two cases concerned eminent
domain and have helped to clarify the third type of abstention. Frank Mashuda Co. and
Louisiana Power & Light Co. are not easily reconcilable; but they do establish the principle
that the abstention doctrine is applicable in eminent domain cases. Where the state law
question is unsettled due to the special nature of eminent domain proceedings and where
the state law is difficult to ascertain, then abstention is proper.
The fourth type of abstention contemplates staying or dismissing an action by the federal
court solely on the basis that there is a similar action already pending in state court. This
type of abstention avoids duplicate litigation. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Cox v. Planning Dist. I Community Mental Health & Retarda-
tion Servs. Bd., 669 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1982). See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 4241-4247 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1985) (thorough
discussion of all four types of abstention).
38. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1976). But see Therm-
tron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344-75 (1976) (district court cannot re-
mand case back to state court after removal because the district court considers itself too
busy to hear it).
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rights of free expression and association including social associa-
tion with other nudists on public beaches, as well as the fourteenth
amendment right of personal autonomy and liberty. These three
grounds for challenging local ordinances prohibiting nude sun-
bathing promise the most potential for successful constitutional
attack.
A. Nude Sunbathing as Symbolic Speech
The rights and guarantees of the first amendment are some of
the most broadly interpreted and universally protected principles
of the United States Constitution. 9 Within the first amendment,
the specific freedom of expression has earned a "preferred" and
more zealously guarded position than any other guarantees.4 0 Such
39. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ("The safeguarding of these rights to
the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods
may be exposed through the process of education and discussion is essential to free
government.").
Freedom of expression continues to be accepted as the core of our structure of indi-
vidual rights. It remains the foundation of our efforts to obtain the proper balance
between individual liberty and collective responsibility. And it still provides the
framework within which our society tries to achieve necessary, nonviolent, social
change.
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 422
(1980). See generally L. '1!R.BE, CONSTrrtnONAL CHOICES 188-220 (1985); R. RossuM & G.
TARR, AumERc a CONSTUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND INMRPRETATION 367-88 (1983).
40. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-96 (1949) (The Court held that the city
ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks on city streets did not deny plaintiff's free-
dom of speech. Both the majority opinion authored by Justice Reed as well as the concur-
ring opinion of Justice Frankfurter discussed the "preferred position" of freedom of speech).
See generally L. TRME, supra note 19, at 565; Emerson, supra note 39, at 430-31, 441-43;
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 65-
66 (1975) (discussing the preferred position of freedom of expression as articulated in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)).
The following cases present a chronological account of the evolution of the "preferred
position" of freedom of speech: Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (the power of
the state to abridge freedom of speech is the exception and not the rule); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4. (1938) ("There may be narrower scope for opera-
tion of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition ... of the first ten amendments."); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939) (where an infringement of free expression is alleged, mere legislative prefer-
ences respecting matters of public convenience may be insufficient to justify an infringe-
ment of rights so vital to the maintenance of the democratic institution); Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941) (a substantial evil alone will not justify a restriction upon
freedom of speech; consequently, the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before freedom of expression can be punished); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 510 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (several of the Jehovah's
Witnesses cases refer to the "preferred position" of the first amendment); see also Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 (1949) (for other Jehovah's Witnesses cases); Thomas v. Collins, 323
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:589
elevated protection serves "to assure the unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political or social changes desired
by the people. ' 41 The United States Supreme Court has held that
"[c]easeless vigilance is the watchward to prevent their [the funda-
mental freedoms of speech and press] erosion by Congress or by
the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into [free
expression] cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and
opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment
upon more important interests. '42 Freedom of expression has
greatly contributed to the development of ideas in our society, and
this freedom must be preserved if society can hope for continued
growth and development. 3 The first amendment protection is not
limited to popular mainstream beliefs: "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, contro-
versial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin-
ion-have the full protection of the guarantees. '44 Indeed, the first
amendment has been held to protect such controversial beliefs and
conduct as adultery,45 sodomy,46 communism, 47 labor activism,
48
U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (only the gravest abuses which endanger paramount interests give rea-
son for permissible limitation on the freedom of expression); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ("The test of legislation which collides with the
Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much
more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved."); infra notes 121-48 and
accompanying text (discussing liberty interest).
41. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). This objective-the unfettered ex-
change of ideas-was made explicit as early as 1774 in a letter from the Continental Con-
gress to the inhabitants of Quebec:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of press. The importance of this
consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and the arts in general,
in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of
union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.
Id. at 484 (quoting 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)).
42. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
43. Id.; see also Madison Report on the Virginia Resolutions in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 546,
571 (1800). For an historical analysis of the first amendment, see Rabban, The First
Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981); see also Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
44. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484; see also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) ("Its [freedom of expression] guarantee is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the
opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the
single tax.").
45. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985), vacated, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th
Cir. 1986) (Merhige, J., held Virginia's fornication statute unconstitutional); Kingsley, 360
U.S. at 689 (1959).
46. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir.), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (19-8).
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nazism,4e racism,50 totalitarianism,51 and transvestism.52
While the first amendment provides broad coverage for popular
as well as unpopular beliefs, it does not serve as a blanket protec-
tion for all forms of expression." Obscenity,54 for example, "is not
within the area of Constitutionally protected speech or press. ' '55
Historically, obscenity has not warranted constitutional protection
since it is considered to be utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance.56 By contrast, nudity does have social value, as evidenced by
But see Doe v. Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afl'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976). See generally Note, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes are Constitutional, 26
WM. & MARY L. REv. 645 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Herndon, 301 U.S. 242; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
48. See, e.g., Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88.
49. See, e.g., National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); see
also A. NEmR, DEFENDING MY ENEMY (1979) (Neier was executive director of the ACLU
when the organization agreed to represent the Nazi party in its effort to obtain a march
permit); L. TRIBE, supra note 39, at 219-20.
50. L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 602.
51. See also Duval, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest For Truth: Toward a
Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 161, 237-
42 (1972).
52. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Wilson, 75 IlM. 2d 525, -, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1978)
(Chicago ordinance prohibiting a person from wearing clothing of the opposite sex was
unconstitutional).
53. Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So. 2d 891 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 981 (1971)
(some forms of nude dancing are not protected under the first amendment); see also Anno-
tation, Topless or Bottomless Dancing or Similar Conduct as Offense, 49 A.L.R3n 1084,
1099-1103 (1973). The burning of one's draft card is not protected under the first amend-
ment, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The making of harassing phone calls
does not generally fall under first amendment protection. Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 4
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975).
54. The test for identifying obscenity is
(a) [W]hether the 'average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.... (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See generally R. RossuM & G. TARR, supra note
39, at 383-86 (reviewing the various obscenity tests previously used by the Supreme Court).
Virginia's obscenity statute (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-372 to -389 (Repl. Vol. 1982 & Curn.
Supp. 1985)) complies with the constitutional standards prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Grove Press, Inc. v. Evans, 306 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Va. 1969). The Virginia Supreme Court
has, however, narrowed the definition of obscenity by judicial decisions. E.g., Price v. Com-
monwealth, 214 Va. 490, 201 S.E.2d 798 (1974). See generally Stephenson, State Appellate
Courts and the Judicial Process: Written Obscenity, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 106 (1969);
Comment, The Law of Obscenity in Virginia, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 322 (1960).
55. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 23; Walker, 523 F.2d at 4; Common-
wealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 228 Va. 383, 386, 323 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1984).
56. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
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its prevalence in paintings and sculptures,57 as well as in dramatic
productions." Nudity is not per se obscene or immoral. 59 Conse-
quently, nudity in dances,e° movies," plays,62 and publications 63 isprotected by the first amendment freedom of expression.
Although an activity such as nude dancing does not contain
traditional speech characteristics, it nevertheless is afforded consti-
tutional protection because the conduct is communicative in na-
ture. 4 Conduct which expresses certain beliefs is deemed "sym-
57. E.g., Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 67 (D. Md. 1970).
58. E.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (the action of mu-
nicipal board denying use of city auditorium for "Hair," which included nudity during the
stage production, was an unconstitutional prior restraint).
59. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213 (striking down local ordinance prohibiting the showing of
films containing nudity by drive-in theater when its screen was visible from the public
street).
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibili-
ties. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide which
types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer. . . .[T]he burden normally falls upon the viewer to
"avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes."
Id. at 210-11 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). The Virginia courts have
also held that nudity is not necessarily obscenity. House v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 121, 169
S.E.2d 572 (1969); see also Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (involving the film
"Carnal Knowledge"); Manual Enters. Inv. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (involving magazines
with pictures of near-nude male models); United States v. Central 25,000 Magazines, Enti-
tled "Revue," 254 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Central
Magazine Sales, Ltd., 381 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1967) (not all photographs of nude women in
magazines are obscene).
In Bruns, the court stated:
There is hardly an art museum or gallery to which one can go where completely nude
statues and pictures are not on constant and prominent exhibition.. . . Nudism may
be unappealing and unattractive to some people. It may be repulsive and vulgar to
others. But that does not limit its right to constitutional protection. Whether or not it
appeals to or repels an individual's sensitivities is irrelevant when a court is bound to
apply First Amendment rights which do not incorporate such subjective standards.
Bruns, 319 F. Supp. at 67.
60. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (local zoning
ordinance which prohibited live nude dancing from commercial uses violated plaintiffs' first
amendment right of free expression); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)
(under some circumstances nude barroom dancing is protected); California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (upholding a regulation banning nude dancing, due to the broad powers
conferred to the states by the twenty-first amendment; the Court, nevertheless, recognized
that some performances are within the constitutional protection of free expression). See
generally Annotation, supra note 53.
61. See, e.g., Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205.
62. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
63. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968) ("girlie" picture magazines
involved were not obscene for adults).
64. Live entertainment such as musical or dramatic works falls within first amendment
protection. Schad, 452 U.S. at 65. Where the purpose of particular clothing is for the expres-
1986] NUDE SUNBATHING
bolic speech" insofar as the communicative intent of the actor is
closely akin to pure speech.6 5 Similarly, conduct which is a vehicle
or substitute for verbal communication is protected by the first
amendment since the conduct itself communicates the ideas.
Courts have found conduct amounting to protected symbolic
speech where one wears a black armband to protest war,66 burns an
American flag to highlight a speech denouncing the government's
failure to protect a civil rights leader, 7 refuses to recite the Pledge
sion of certain views, then the act is symbolic speech falling within first amendment protec-
tion. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (wear-
ing black armbands in protest of Vietnam war was protected symbolic speech). See Note,
Symbolic Speech, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 590 (1975) (comparing communicative and noncom-
municative conduct).
65. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 365 (1931) (display
of red flag was protected symbolic speech). But cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555
(1965) (first amendment does not afford the same protection to ideas communicated by con-
duct as it does to ideas communicated by pure speech). See generally Note, Symbolic Con-
duct, 68 COLU. L. REV. 1091, 1105-09 (1968) (analyzing conduct that amounts to protected
speech). Several professors have developed differing approaches to determine whether con-
duct will be protected under the first amendment. See, e.g., L. TamE, supra note 39, at 198-
210 (speech and conduct distinction); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 1009-12 (1978) (expression and action dichotomy); Emerson,
supra note 39, at 431-33, 470-77 (reviewing Profs. Tribe, Baker and Emerson's approach to
conduct as speech).
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft card was symbolic speech,
but government's interest in the Selective Service outweighed the infringement on free ex-
pression), the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea .... This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" ele-
ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms.
Id. at 376; see infra note 89; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555-56 (1965) (ideas
communicated by conduct are not afforded the same protection as ideas communicated by
speech); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (holding that it is not
an abridgement of free expression "to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language"); cf. Note,
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Desecration of National Symbols as Protected
Political Expression, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1040 (1968) [hereinafter Desecration of National
Symbols]. Expressions may not enjoy first amendment protection if they are of such slight
social value that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
public interest in limiting their dissemination. Id. at 1042-43 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
66. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
67. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974) (Washington flag misuse statute was unconstitutional as applied to college student
who hung the flag upside down with a peace symbol affixed to it to express his opinion that
America stood for peace).
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of Allegiance because of religious beliefs,68 hangs offensive articles
on a clothesline to protest high taxes,69 wears long hair to protest
school regulations,70 burns a draft card in protest of war,71 displays
a red flag in support of communism, 2 and engages in sit-in demon-
strations to protest segregation and discrimination. 3
To be worthy of constitutional protection, nude sunbathing
would have to be characterized as nonverbal expression or "sym-
bolic speech. '7 4 Nude sunbathers, like students who wear black
armbands in protest of war, must be shown to be engaging in the
conduct for the purpose of expressing certain beliefs. Accordingly,
proponents of social nudism assert that they are advocating a sepa-
rate philosophy and life-style.75 The idea they are expressing is
that the human body is wholesome and that nudity is decent.76
Furthermore, nude sunbathers allege that acceptance of the nude
body is the basis for mental, spiritual and physical well-being, and
is a proper orientation for raising children.77 These nude sunbath-
ers claim that they are not flaunting social mores, but are practic-
ing the philosophy that they advocate and are demonstrating the
sincerity of their ideas.
Thus, advocates of social nudism claim that nude sunbathing
"conveys a message . . . . It involves essentially symbolic and de-
monstrative expression of an idea and philosophy that bathing or
68. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also Russo v.
Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973)
(teacher's first amendment rights were violated when school officials discharged her for
standing silently at attention during daily pledge of allegiance).
69. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 469, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 739,
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
70. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); see infra notes 125-32 and ac-
companying text (length of one's hair may be symbolic speech, but court chose to treat it as
a protected right to be secure in one's person).
71. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (although the conduct was symbolic
speech, it was nonetheless subject to governmental regulation).
72. Stromberg, 283 U.S. 359.
73. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Desecration of National Symbols,
supra note 65; Note, Symbolic Conduct, supra note 65, at 1094. The mere failure to rise in a
courtroom upon the command of a United States marshal is not "behavior," but rather
symbolic speech. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 660 (4th Cir. 1974).
74. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
75. Brief for Plaintiffs at 10, South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608
(11th Cir. 1984).
76. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d at 609.
77. NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
604
NUDE SUNBATHING
swimming on a public beach can be a wholesome activity without
shame and perfectly acceptable under contemporary mores. '7 8 The
plaintiffs in National Capital Naturist elaborated in their com-
plaint as the essence of this view as well as its limitations:
The practice of social nudism lessens morbid curiosity about con-
cealed sexual characteristics and minimizes the manifestations of
certain sexual aberrations which are assumed to eminate from the
perpetual concealment of the body's erogenic zones. The moderate
exposure of the entire human body to sunlight and fresh air, the
natural elements of man's ecological environment, is deemed by
them to be generally healthful and relaxing. Nudity is considered a
reasonable state for engaging in individual and group activity such
as swimming, sunbathing, airbathing, physical exercises, and group
games and sports .... The nudity philosophy does not assert, envi-
sion or promote a clothesless society per se.7 1
Only a few federal courts have addressed the constitutionality of
local ordinances prohibiting nude sunbathing, each having held
that nude sunbathing is not an "expression" protected by the first
amendment.80 Although the issue of nude sunbathing as protected
symbolic speech under the first amendment was preliminarily
raised in National Capital Naturist, the question was not resolved
due to the court's application of the abstention doctrine. While
nude sunbathers allege that they are engaging in conduct which
expresses ideas and beliefs, the courts generally hold that nude
sunbathing is "fundamentally individualistic and personal rather
than expressive or communicative." 8' It is thought that while
nudity is itself not obscene,8 2 neither is it communicative. 3 Most
recently, the Eleventh Circuit held that "[n]udity is protected as
speech only when combined with some mode of expression which
itself is entitled to First Amendment protection.
8 s4
78. Brief for Plaintiffs at 15, South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d 608.
79. See supra notes 2-3.
80. See supra note 10.
81. Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 126 (D. Mass. 1975). The courts have held
that nude sunbathing, like wearing one's hair long, lacks communicative character sufficient
to warrant the full protection of the first amendment. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d
1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970) (long hair lacks communicative feature).
82. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
83. Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (ordinance
prohibiting nude sunbathing held valid exercise of police power).
84. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d at 610 (quoting Chapin, 457 F. Supp. at
1174).
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But while the courts have thus far held that nude sunbathing is
not symbolic speech, there arguably is some justification for find-
ing such conduct protected. However, nudity in sunbathing alone
will deserve constitutional protection only when the act of nude
sunbathing is shown to convey a particular message or philosophy.
The emergence of the nationwide and well-organized social nudism
movement may prove to be instrumental in making such a showing
and could be ultimately responsible for attaining constitutional
protection for nude bathers. In the past, nude sunbathing had
been considered nothing more than a modern form of self-expres-
sion and relaxation; however, today the nationally organized as-
sociations can advocate nude sunbathing as a medium for expres-
sing certain legitimate nudism beliefs and doctrine worthy of
societal recognition and constitutional protection.8 5 If, through col-
lective groups, proponents could present nude sunbathing as com-
municating an idea, belief or message, rather than simply as an
individualistic preference, the courts would be compelled to afford
nude sunbathing constitutional protection to invalidate local ordi-
nances which seek to prohibit it.
There are similarities between nude sunbathing as an expression
of a way of life and the wearing of a black armband as a protest of
war. Consequently, the protection afforded the latter should, by
analogy, extend to the former. However, plaintiffs undertaking the
task of linking nude sunbathing to symbolic speech will undoubt-
edly encounter much resistance from the judiciary as well as from
the general public. The claim that individuals have a right to sun-
bathe in the nude is a far cry from the traditional, mainstream
belief held by the general public and most judges. Due to the sensi-
tive and revealing nature of nude sunbathing, the courts will be
reluctant to afford blanket first amendment protection to such
nontraditional activity. Elevating nude sunbathing to the status of
symbolic speech warranting constitutional protection will depend
in large part upon the collective efforts of national groups and the
strength of the analogies drawn between this activity and others
now protected.
In the event that nude sunbathing were held to constitute com-
municative conduct rising to the level of symbolic speech, the legis-
lation banning nude sunbathing would nonetheless be permissible
85. The first amendment freedom of expression has traditionally protected those




if an overriding important governmental interest were demon-
strated. If the regulation satisfies the O'Brien test, then the local-
ity may infringe upon the plaintiffs' constitutional right to sun-
bathe in the nude. Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v. O'Brien, 6 incidental limitations on
first amendment freedoms may be justified. s That decision articu-
lated a four-part test for determining when a governmental inter-
est permits the regulation of expressive conduct. Regulation is per-
mitted (1) if the regulation is within the constitutional power of
the government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the incidental restric-
tion of alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is es-
sential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
Local ordinances prohibiting nude sunbathing would appear to
exemplify permissible regulation under the O'Brien test. First,
these ordinances are clearly within the localities' power to enact.88
Second, these ordinances usually further some governmental inter-
est such as environmental control, traffic flow, litter prevention, or
parking regulation.8 9 Whether a governmental interest rises to the
level of substantiality required by O'Brien will depend on the exact
interest served by the ordinance and will require judicial interpre-
tation of the particular governmental objective as implied or ar-
ticulated in the statute or legislative history. Similarly, the third
and fourth factors of the O'Brien test must be analyzed in light of
the particular governmental interest served by the ordinance.
Since localities may have different reasons for enacting such an or-
dinance, it would be impractical to draw any sweeping conclusions
which attempt to balance the government's interest against the in-
dividual's right of expression. In any event, plaintiffs challenging
the local ordinances must be aware of the O'Brien test and recog-
nize the localities' right to infringe on symbolic speech, provided
that the four requirements of O'Brien are satisfied.90
86. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upheld constitutionality of federal statute punishing destruction
of selective service certificates).
87. Id. at 377; see supra note 65; see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 128 (1972).
See generally Ely, supra note 73; Desecration of National Symbols, supra note 65, at 1054-
55 (reviewing the O'Brien analysis).
88. See supra note 9.
89. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 805-06 (1st Cir. 1976) (upheld constitutionality of
ban on nude sunbathing).
90. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the four-part O'Brien analysis in
Jim Crockett Promotions, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 706 F.2d 486, 491 (4th Cir. 1983); Hart
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B. Nude Sunbathing as a Right of Association
The second substantive constitutional challenge is the conten-
tion that these laws unconstitutionally interfere with the plaintiffs'
right of association. The few challenges to these local ordinances
thus far have included the assertion that "the first amendment
clearly protects the right of nudists to associate with one another
to advocate and promote their views."91 The right of association,
like the freedom of expression, may still be limited by reasonable
legislation that regulates the time, place, and manner of first
amendment guarantees.2 Consequently, plaintiffs challenging
Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 828-30 (4th Cir. 1979). The Virginia Supreme
Court has also followed O'Brien. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 228 Va.
383, 388, 323 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1984).
91. Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170, 1175 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting
Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 65 (D. Md. 1970)) (holding that a person could not be
denied a job as a patrolman simply because he is a member of a nudist group). Nudists have
the right to associate in camps. Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
The wiles and lures of that most peculiar cult completely elude me. It seems in fact
something of a mystery why those who engage in its strange practices are willing to
suffer both the stings of outraged public opinion and voracious, ravenous insects in
order to pursue its illusory rewards. To my personal way of thinking the theories of
nudism are not only foolish but down right distasteful and indelicate. But as such
theories play no legitimate part in a judicial opinion, I shall call all personal remarks
short, simply stating in our triune form of government it is the particular duty of the
judiciary to protect individuals and minorities in their constitutional rights even
though their beliefs and activities may be heretical or unpopular.
Id. at 850 (Darr, J., concurring) (holding that the law which made it unlawful to engage in
nudist practices in Tennessee was unconstitutional since it violated substantive due
process).
92. A locality may infringe on first amendment rights if the ordinance merely regulates
time, place, or manner. See Karst, supra note 40, at 28, 35-56. A government clearly has no
power to restrict constitutionally protected expression because of its message; nevertheless,
"reasonable time, place and manner regulations may be necessary to further significant gov-
ernmental interests." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); see also Police
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
576 (1941). See generally Karst, supra note 40 (discussing Mosley and the principle of equal
liberty of expression in the first amendment). The Fourth Circuit in Davenport v. City of
Alexandria, 710 F.2d 148, 151-52 (4th Cir. 1983), held (1) that time, place, and manner
restrictions and enforcement cannot be based on the content of the speech (citing Consoli-
dated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)); (2) that a
compelling governmental interest unrelated to speech must be served (citing Hickory Fire
Fighters Ass'n v. City of Hickory, 656 F.2d 917, 923 (4th Cir. 1981)); (3) that the ordinances
restricting free expression must be drawn with narrow specificity so as to be no more restric-
tive than is necessary (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17); (4) that adequate alternative
channels of communication must be left open by the restrictions (citing Schad v. Borough of
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981)); and (5) that reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions cannot vest discretion in officials to grant or withhold a permit. See, e.g., Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395,
406-07 (1953).
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these ordinances under the first amendment rights of association
and expression must recognize that if the local ordinance qualifies
as a time, place, or manner regulation, then, even though the law
infringes upon the plaintiffs' constitutional right to sunbathe in
the nude, the ordinance will still be permissible. It would be very
difficult for a locality to argue that an ordinance constituting a to-
tal prohibition on nude sunbathing, without regard to any specified
area of a public beach, regulates merely time, place, and manner."3
It is significant that plaintiff-nudists, such as those in National
Capital Naturist, that have attempted to challenge these local or-
dinances do not advocate nudity on the entire public beach but
rather argue that at least a part of the beach should be set aside
for optional nude sunbathing.94
In order to fully understand the nudists' claim that they have a
right to associate together in the nude, it is necessary to review the
history of the right and its expansion. The right of association is
not explicitly set forth in the first amendment. Nevertheless, it has
long been recognized as implicit in the freedoms of speech, assem-
bly, and petition.95 The "right of association, like the right of be-
lief, is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes the
right to express one's attitudes or philosophies."9 6 Historically, the
93. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17 (The regulation must be narrowly tailored to further
the state's legitimate interest; and free expression cannot be denied under the guise of regu-
lation.); see also Schad, 452 U.S. at 75-76 (alternative channels of communication must re-
main open).
94. See Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 806 (1st Cir. 1976); NCN's Complaint, supra
note 1, at 4.
95. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958) (Harlan, J., for a unanimous court); see also Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6
(1971); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937); National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th Cir.
1973). See generally Baker, supra note 65, at 1003-35; Emerson, Freedom of Association
and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 1-3 (1964); Raggi, An Independent Right to
Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 2 (1977).
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (association itself is a form of ex-
pression); Lindenbaum v. City of Philadelphia, 584 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
("The decision to affiliate oneself with a particular group carries with it the willingness to be
associated with the principles and purposes for which that group stands .... Infringement
of the right of association necessarily involves infringement of the right of expression.");
Emerson, supra note 95, at 21-22, 24-26 (the right of association is simply an extension of
the individual's right of expression). See generally notes 80-86 and accompanying text
(nude sunbathing as right of expression).
The right of association has traditionally been employed in the political arena so that
organizations may collectively promote a certain belief. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (the right to associate for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1976) (The right of association is protected
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core of the first amendment freedom of association has been the
advancement of ideas.9 7 This right extends to social, political, reli-
gious, and cultural associations,98 regardless of the unorthodox na-
ture of the beliefs or the manner of expressing them.9 9 The United
States Supreme Court has held that the first amendment protects
the rights of individuals to associate and to advance their personal
beliefs. 100 This freedom of association to advance any belief is care-
fully guarded from both subtle governmental influence and "heavy
handed frontal attack" by the government.101
The right of association has recently been expanded by federal
courts beyond associations which are merely for the purpose of ad-
vancing shared beliefs; even purely social and personal associa-
tions'02 have been held worthy of protection. This more expansive
since it promotes and may well be essential to the "[elffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones that the First Amendment is designed
to foster.") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976), aff'g 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.
1975)); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460 ("it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty'
assured by . . . the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also infra notes 119-46 and accompany-
ing text (nude sunbathing as a protected liberty interest).
97. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960).
98. The right to associate is commonly considered in connection with political associa-
tions, but the Supreme Court has held that this right pertains to any belief. NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.
Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), afl'd, 393 U.S. 14 (1968). The right of association guarantees freedom
of association to all persons, regardless of their views or their manner of expressing those
views. Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 65 (D. Md. 1970); see also Ringers, 473 F.2d at
1015 (the right of association protects popular as well as unpopular expressions). If a state
denies the right of association to an unpopular group, then the first amendment "will be
substantially emasculated." Id. at 1016.
69. Bruns, 319 F. Supp. at 65.
100. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
101. Bates, 361 U.S. at 523. See generally Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147 (1969) (overturned convictions based upon vague ordinances which imposed prior re-
straints on expression); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (struck down compelled
disclosure of membership lists); Thomas, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (invalidated registration re-
quirements for labor organizations).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that when first amendment rights are at issue the
state must show convincingly the substantial relation between the information sought and
the infringement on the compelling state interest. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963). Even where the government's purpose is legitimate, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be achieved by less drastic means. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960).
102. See, e.g., Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a police
officer's discharge for dating the daughter of a convicted felon who was reported to be a key
figure in organized crime unconstitutionally infringed on the police officer's right of associa-
tion); Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an individual's first
amendment right of association was violated by an overbroad anti-loitering ordinance); see
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reading of the right of association has been adopted by the Elev-
enth and Fifth Circuits, as well as by several federal district
courts. 0 3 In analyzing a right of association claim under this ex-
pansive interpretation, the question is not whether the individuals
advance common beliefs but rather whether they wish to associate
with one another. 10 4 Under this modern interpretation, associations
simply for social and personal reasons may be protected. 10 5
The federal cases that have dealt with nude sunbathing have
held that the activity is more individualistic than associational. 0 6
Although an issue in other federal cases challenging the local ordi-
nances, the right to sunbathe in the nude was not specifically
raised as a protected right of association by the plaintiffs in Na-
tional Capital Naturist. In Williams v. Hathaway, the district
court held as follows:
[A nude bather's] purpose and intent is more individualistic than
associational. While nude bathers may find comfort in numbers,
those numbers have not been caused by a conscious, collective effort
to seek out other nudists but are merely the result of a heretofore
tolerant attitude toward nudity at this beach.'
In the past, proponents of nude sunbathing did not argue that they
frequented the public beach for organizational or associational
purposes, and, consequently, the courts drew a distinction between
groups concerned with discussing and promoting a pleasurable ac-
tivity, and those gatherings of people merely desiring to pursue
that activity where it can take place.108 The courts found that nude
sunbathers fell into the latter category of people-those simply
also McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 497 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 647
F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981); Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Bruns, 319 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981).
103. See supra note 102.
104. Wilson, 733 F.2d at 1543-44.
105. A nudist has the constitutional right to associate with other nudists. Bruns, 319 F.
Supp. at 65. "It is the interaction, the association, which is protected. The [first amend-
ment] protection does not come into play only when two or more individuals seek to distill
the fruits of their relationship into a body of thought or into a political program." Wilson,
733 F.2d at 1544.
106. See supra note 10.
107. Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 126-27 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd sub nom.
Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976) (emphasis added); see supra notes 2-3
(discussing the collective nature of the nudist movement).
108. Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 806 n.9, quoted in Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F.
Supp. 1170, 1175 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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gathering to individually pursue an activity, rather than associat-
ing together to promote a belief. One court has, in dicta, suggested
that people may associate together on public beaches and advocate
the benefits of nude sunbathing, albeit fully clothed. 10 9 Other
courts have simply dismissed right of association claims based on
the individualistic (as opposed to the associational) nature of nude
sunbathing. 1 0
Under the modern view of association, the right is seen as more
social in nature and now encompasses those organizations which do
not necessarily purport to advocate ideas. The right of association
can be interpreted as a right "to simply meet with others.""' If
this interpretation of the right of association is applied to nude
sunbathing, then nude sunbathers may be permitted to interact
with one another in the nude without the interference of govern-
ment regulation. In fact, if the modern trend is adopted, the
courts' earlier distinction" 2 between an individualistic activity and
one prompting an idea will no longer prove a viable basis for deny-
ing nude sunbathing constitutional protection. As a result, locali-
ties arguably may not infringe upon nude sunbathers' right of asso-
ciation, even though the sunbathers are merely pursuing a
pleasurable activity with fellow nudists.1 3
Even under the traditional view of the right of association" 4
which states that individuals have the right to gather together and
advance common beliefs, nude sunbathing may be entitled to some
constitutional protection. However, nude sunbathers must show
that they attend the beach for associational rather than individual-
istic purposes and not merely to express favorable attitudes to-
wards nudity. In the language of the courts, they must demon-
strate that they gather "by a conscious, collective effort to seek out
other nudists."" 5 This associational-as distinguished from an in-
dividualistic-purpose for attending the beach will be given more
109. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 1984).
110. Id. (nude bathers may advocate their beliefs while fully dressed); see supra note 10
(nude sunbathers do not have an associational claim because of the personal character of
nude sunbathing).
111. Wilson, 733 F.2d at 1543 (citing Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980)).
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
113. Cf. Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 806 n.9 (distinguishing groups concerned with discussing a
pleasurable activity from those which gather merely to pursue that activity).
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. See generally Raggi, supra note 95, at 4.
115. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 127; see also supra notes 2, 3 & 107. See generally Raggi,
supra note 95, at 11-14.
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legitimacy through the organized groups which advocate the publi-
cized beliefs of nude sunbathers, in stark contrast to loose coalition
of individuals enjoying the benefits of nude sunbathing." 6
In any event, the necessity of showing a valid associational pur-
pose for nude sunbathing will be as crucial to protection under the
right of association as the necessity of showing a communicative
character for protection under freedom of expression.1 7 However,
unlike the right of expression theory, the associational claim has
not been routinely raised by plaintiffs, and consequently, has not
been frequently addressed by the courts. While the federal courts
will in all likelihood follow the dicta of the Eleventh Circuit 1 and
hold that nude sunbathers have associational rights to gather to-
gether and advocate certain beliefs, the right of association will not
extend to such gatherings while in the nude. In other words, the
courts will likely afford nude sunbathers the opportunity to associ-
ate with one another and share their philosophy, but a narrow in-
terpretation of the right will result in little protection to individu-
als associating while nude on public beaches. The right of
association argument should always be asserted by plaintiffs, but
the limitations of such a theory and the court's tendency to permit
such association only when persons are fully clothed should be
recognized.
116. The growth of both the Naturist and the American Sunbathing Association may
prove the collective conscious group necessary to advocate nude sunbathing and to obtain
constitutional protection under the right of association. See supra notes 2-3 and accompa-
nying text. For a review of the history of ASA, see Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835,
837-38 (E.D. Tenn 1966). Organized groups, rather than individual plaintiffs, are now chal-
lenging these ordinances in court. See, e.g., South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d 608
(both an association and individual plaintiff, Gary Bryant, brought the suit); National Capi-
tal Naturist, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Accomack County, No. 85-452-N (E.D. Va. filed
June 25, 1985) (this suit was brought by a Virginia nonstock corporation, as well as several
individual plaintiffs). When a collective group, speaking for its members, promotes a belief,
the expression of those ideas appears more associational than individualistic.
117. The courts that have addressed the constitutionality of local ordinances banning
nude sunbathing tend to focus on the individualistic character of nude sunbathing. For in-
stance, the courts have refused to afford freedom of expression protection to nude sun-
bathing because nude sunbathing is "fundamentally individualistic and personal rather than
expressive or communicative." Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 126. Likewise, the courts refuse
to grant protection to nude sunbathing under the right of association because such activity
"is more individualistic than associational." Id. at 126-27. Therefore, if proponents of nude
sunbathing could stress the expressive and associational character of nude bathing, then the
likelihood of obtaining constitutional protection is greater. One possible means of advocat-
ing the expressive and associational nature of the activity is through a national or regional
collective group such as the Naturists or American Sunbathing Association.
118. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d at 610; see supra note 110 and accompany-
ing text.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:589
C. Nude Sunbathing as a Protected Personal Liberty Interest
The third substantive challenge to these local ordinances is the
claim that they unconstitutionally infringe upon plaintiffs' per-
sonal liberty or right of autonomy.119 The protection afforded by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment encompasses
a wide array of liberty interests from choices regarding procrea-
tion120 to the length of an individual's hair. 21 Courts have held
119. Closely analogous to the personal liberty interest of the fourteenth amendment is the
right of privacy contained in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86
(1977) (recognizing a right of privacy); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (fundamen-
tal privacy interests); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (protected zones of privacy).
See generally R. RossuM & G. TARR, supra note 39, at 701-11; Henkin, Privacy and Auton-
omy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1419-24 (1974) (defining privacy rights). Cases on the right of
privacy indicate that constitutional protection extends to individuals making certain deci-
sions of the most intimate kind, such as those relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion and abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973). The cases also indicate that the
right of privacy has been interpreted to limit a state's power to intrude on the privacy of the
home or to interfere with family ties. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
(1977).
There is recent authority to support the proposition that "[the right to privacy] is not
limited to conduct that takes place strictly in private." Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202,
1211 (11th Cir.) (holding that Georgia's sodomy law infringed upon the fundamental right of
plaintiff, a practicing homosexual), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986); cf. Doe v. Commonwealth's
Att'y of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge district court upheld the
constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy law), afl'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See generally Note,
supra note 46. Arguably, plaintiffs challenging local ordinances which ban nude sunbathing
could argue that their right of privacy allows them to sunbathe in the nude. Nevertheless,
most courts of appeals faced with a privacy claim have not accorded constitutional protec-
tion to any matters beyond those relating to marriage, procreation and family arrangements.
See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.) (polygamous marriages), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 145 (1985); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976) (absolute
evidentiary privilege for therapy communications), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); Mc-
Nally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976) (psychiatric report read into
record); O'Brien v. DeGrazia, 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976) (policemen's financial question-
naire); Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975) (father's presence
during natural childbirth), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976); Gotkin v. Miller, 514 F.2d 125
(2d Cir. 1975) (access to hospital records); Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d
1062 (8th Cir.) (spouses' right to work at same school), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975).
120. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425
U.S. 238 (1976) (liberty interest asserted did not involve freedom of choice with regard to
procreation, marriage or family life).
121. See, e.g., Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1973); Arnold v. Carpenter, 459
F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Richards v. Thur-
ston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). See generally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protec-
tion for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, 760-70 (1973).
The liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
includes a parent's right to send his or her child to public or private school. See, e.g., Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400
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that the "sphere of personal liberty" 122 protected by the fourteenth
amendment includes the right "to be let alone in the governance of
those activities which may be deemed uniquely personal.' 123 This
personal liberty interest "is not composed only of fundamental
freedoms, but includes the freedom to make and act on less signifi-
cant personal decisions free of arbitrary governmental interfer-
ence."1 24 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
(1923). The liberty interest also includes the right to travel. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 759 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06
(1964). Many of the cases which assert a liberty interest involve rights expressly guaranteed
by one or more of the first eight amendments. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Constitutional
protection is not limited to specifically enumerated rights, but also encompasses
nonenumerated penumbral rights. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
122. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1284. The right of personal liberties in the fourteenth amend-
ment does not require the state to provide a special forum for the exercise of these personal
liberties. However, when the personal liberty interest "takes on the coloration of a First
Amendment right, only a more compelling [state] interest will justify a limitation on such
activity." Id. at 1284 n.6 (citations omitted); see also Kelley, 425 U.S. at 250 n.2 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (government regulation of personal appearance may in some circumstances
not only deprive plaintiff of liberty under the fourteenth amendment, but also violate his
first amendment rights). See generally Henkin, supra note 119, at 1424-27 (indicating that
the new right of privacy creates freedom of personal autonomy and immunity from
regulation).
123. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1284. "'[L]iberty' seems to us incomplete protection if it en-
compasses only the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with those
personal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy
their liberty." Id. at 1284-85 (citations omitted). See generally Note, supra note 121, at 760-
70 (personal liberty is analogous to a privacy right). At an early date, the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of the liberty interest in personal autonomy by holding:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley: "[t]he right to one's person may be
said to be right of complete immunity; to be let alone."
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
124. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd in part sub norm. Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (The circuit court had considered plaintiff's argument that a
regulation regarding hair length of police officers violated civil rights and held that the dis-
trict court had erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the action. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that such regulations are sufficiently related to the government's
interest in fostering the "espirit de corps."). But see Kelley, 425 U.S. at 250-51:
An individual's personal appearance may reflect, sustain, and nourish his personality
and may well be used as a means of expressing his attitude and lifestyle. In taking
control over a citizen's personal appearance, the government forces him to sacrifice
substantial elements of his integrity and identity as well. To say that the liberty guar-
antee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass matters of personal appear-
ance would be fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy, self-identity,
autonomy, and personal integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was
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state regulation of "personal appearance is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy and per-
sonal integrity that . . . the Constitution was designed to pro-
tect.112 5 Closely related to personal liberties is a universal "right of
personhood," as termed by former Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Craven. 12 This "right of personhood" includes the freedom
to wear a hat, to attend a football game or "to do everything which
injures no one else.""11 7
Proponents of nude sunbathing assert that the protected liberty
interest in matters of personal appearance includes the right to
sunbathe in the nude.128 In Williams v. Kleppe, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed, holding that nude sunbathing as a liberty
interest is entitled to some constitutional protection; 29 but that
holding must be limited to the facts of the case. Although the lib-
erty interest in nude sunbathing had not been declared a funda-
mental right by the courts,130 the Kleppe court determined that it
designed to protect.
Id. at 250-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (such regulations must withstand fourteenth amend-
ment scrutiny) (citations omitted). For a review of the personal liberty interest in the due
process clause, see Poe v. Pullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 110
(right to terminate pregnancy is founded in concept of personal liberty); Griswold, 381 U.S.
479 (marital privacy encompassed within concept of liberty). See generally Comment, Fun-
damental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807,
817-22 (1973); Note, supra note 121, at 762 (the right to be let alone).
125. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 251 (1976).
126. Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DurE L.J. 699.
127. Id. at 699. The right of personhood reflects the judicial recognition that personal
rights may not be arbitrarily and capriciously invalidated by governmental action unless the
personhood right is outweighed by the state interest. Judge Craven further states that
"[P]ersonhood . . . is not a narrow concept. Included are those myriad activities, decisions
and idiosyncrasies which . . . are not considered to be within the ambit of fundamental
rights." Id. at 706, 710; see also Note, supra note 121, at 762 (the right to be let alone).
128. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 806-07 (1st Cir. 1976), af'g sub nom. Williams v.
Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 127 (D. Mass. 1975).
129. Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 807.
130. Id.; Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 128; cf. Appellants Brief at 30-31, Kleppe, 539 F.2d
803 ("Fundamentality" is not a talismanic word that triggers heightened judicial scrutiny. A
"fundamental right" is simply a right that "is among the rights and liberties protected by
the Constitution") (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriques, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Powell, J.)). Fundamental rights include interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); privacy, Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; voting, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Judge Craven concludes:
[T]he rights of man are literally innumerable, but very few of them deserve to be
labelled "fundamental." The remaining ones are of varying degrees of importance and
are legitimately subject to regulation in pursuance of a countervailing state interest.
Under the currently employed judicial method of vindicating individual rights, how-
ever, the state is given virtually complete discretion in the regulation of lesser rights,
while being precluded from interfering with those rights deemed fundamental.
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nevertheless deserved some constitutional protection. The court
reasoned that the protected liberty interest was, in part, derived
from the traditional use of the area as a nude beach and from the
secluded nature of the beach involved in that case.131 The district
court held that its special character as a traditional "nude beach"
distinguished it from other public areas; thus, constitutional pro-
tection was warranted.1
32
Once a personal liberty interest in nude sunbathing is shown to
exist, the individual's interest in the protected liberty must be bal-
anced against the state's legitimate interest in the regulation. 133 If
the state's interest in the ordinance outweighs the individual's lib-
erty interest, then the intrusion is justified. Since nude sunbathing
is not a fundamental right,13 4 the state is not held to the higher
level of strict scrutiny which requires the government to show a
compelling interest in the ordinances and an exhaustion of less re-
strictive alternatives.'3 5 Although nude sunbathing is not a funda-
Craven, supra note 126, at 720.
131. For 40 to 50 years this beach, which was hidden behind some of the highest sand
dunes on Cape Cod, had been used by individuals, couples and small groups for skinny-
dipping and nude sunbathing. Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 805; see also NCN's Complaint, supra
note 1, at 8. The court's constitutional protection in Hathaway was limited to this one area
since this was the only area shown by the plaintiffs to be a nude beach by tradition and
custom. Id. at 127 n.1. The plaintiffs' attack on the total ban imposed on nude sunbathing is
founded on the theory that they and their predecessors at the beach have, through long-
tolerated practice of nude sunbathing, accrued a substantially protected constitutional right.
The plaintiffs assert in their brief:
"[W]here. . . tradition, custom and usage have given rise to the reasonable expecta-
tion that one may engage in a harmless, healthful activity outside the sight of those
who might be offended without fear of harassment, arrest and prosecution, there ex-
ists a right to nudity." Plaintiffs do not claim that the right entitles them to be free
from any restraint. They seek "only the right to continue their practice in numbers
consonant with environmental needs somewhere within the seashore." [Emphasis in
brief.] They claim that this right, though acquired through prescription, is one of the
smaller liberties entitled to substantive constitutional protection. Government en-
croachment is only authorized if the government interest involved is important and
cannot be served by more selective or less restrictive measures.
Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 806 (quoting plaintiffs' brief).
132. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 127.
133. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1285; see, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957)
(extraction of blood permissible, based on state courts' ability to use evidence even in viola-
tion of exclusionary rule); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (state's interest in obtaining blood sample outweighed per-
son's freedom from unreasonable searches and did not violate fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination). But see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applied exclusionary
rule to state court proceedings).
134. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. Under the strict scrutiny or compelling interest tests, the infringement on the plain-
tiff's fundamental right must be necessary to promote the state's compelling interest. See,
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mental right, it is nevertheless a significant personal liberty inter-
est'36 and is thus accorded intermediate scrutiny.137 This standard
of review necessitates consideration of three factors: (1) the nature
of the liberty interest asserted; (2) the context in which it is as-
serted; and (3) the extent to which the intrusion is confined to the
legitimate public interest to be served. 38
e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (states' durational requirement of one year wait-
ing period prior to receiving welfare benefits unconstitutionally burdened plaintiff's funda-
mental right to travel). Strict scrutiny also requires that the state exhaust all less restrictive
alternatives. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
136. See Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 807; Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 127.
137. The court applied an intermediate standard of review in determining whether the
state's interest outweighed the plaintiffs' interest in nude sunbathing. Kleppe, 539 F.2d at
807; Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 129.
The Supreme Court has formally adopted only the strict scrutiny test and the rational
relationship test, holding that legislation will be sustained if there exists any conceivable
basis for the law. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). However, the Justices have
openly taken an intermediate approach to reviewing legislation that affects a significant in-
terest. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (striking down
mandatory leave for pregnant teachers as insufficiently related to articulated goals of con-
tinuity of instruction); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (refusing to sustain contraception regula-
tion which made birth control more readily available to married couples); Meyer, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (striking down postwar legislation that prohibited the teaching of modern foreign
language). When governmental action infringes on a liberty interest, the government has the
affirmative burden of showing a justification for the legislation. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1284-
85; see also Dwen, 438 F.2d at 1130 (any restrictions on personal liberty must be justified by
legitimate state interest reasonably related to the regulation); Appellant's Brief at 24-34;
Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (intermediate scrutiny is the level of review when liberty interests are
burdened).
138. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1285-86. Once the personal liberty interest is shown, the
counteracting state interest must be affirmatively shown. In Richards, the court found no
reason why decency, decorum or good conduct required boys to wear short hair. This inter-
mediate standard of review has been accepted and applied in cases brought by students and
firemen challenging restrictions placed on their personal appearance. See, e.g., Massie v.
Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Crews
v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
Another significant factor in the balancing process between the right to nude sunbathing
and the state's interest in prohibiting such activity is the public versus private aspect of
nudity. One clearly has the right to "appear au naturel at home." Richards, 424 F.2d at
1285. On the other hand, public nudity can be banned. Erznoznik v. City of Miami, 422 U.S.
205 (1975). The difference between public and private nudity is not necessarily the owner-
ship of the situs, but rather the privacy of the act itself and the potential offensiveness to
others. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 127. Nude sunbathers do not advocate that the entire
public beach be open to nude sunbathing, but instead argue that a portion of the beach
should be set aside for optional nude bathing. NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 4; Appel-
lant's Brief at 3, Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (arguing that a total ban was inappropriate and that
nude sunbathers should have the right to sunbathe "somewhere" on Cape Cod). By request-
ing that only a part of the beach be set aside for nude sunbathing, the plaintiffs would not
be offending the general population. If a specific section of the beach is allocated to nude
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Although the First Circuit found that nude sunbathing was a lib-
erty interest protected under the Constitution, the court applied
the above three factors and found that the liberty interest was not
"of such constitutional moment as to require an invalidation of the
regulation."' 39 In analyzing the state intrusion into the personal
liberty interest, the court found the intrusion to be a total and
complete ban 14  on nude sunbathing. The state's justification for
this total intrusion included problems' 4 ' with the environment, lit-
ter, sanitation, maintenance of plant life, traffic, parking and tres-
passing on private property. The court held that the state regula-
tion was sufficiently related to legitimate governmental interests so
as to justify the total prohibition on nude sunbathing. Employing
both the rational relationship test 4 2 and the higher intermediate
level of review,' 3 the court concluded that "barring nude bathing
bears a real and substantial relationship to the [state]
objectives.' 44
Arguably, the personal liberty interest in matters of personal ap-
sunbathing, then both the majority of the population opposed to nude sunbathing and the
minority who advocate nudity will be satisfied. The majority, by attending all parts of the
beach except for the designated nude sunbathing area, would not be exposed to nor of-
fended by nude sunbathers exercising their constitutional right. Likewise, the minority com-
posed of nude sunbathers would be permitted, albeit in specified areas, to practice social
nudism on public beaches. Consequently, both the majority and minority would coexist on
public beaches. Note, however, the other problems caused by a specifically delineated nude
bathing area. See infra note 141.
139. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 129.
140. Plaintiffs argue that the problems associated with nude sunbathing, see infra note
144, could be alleviated through alternative and less restrictive means rather than through a
total prohibition of nude sunbathing. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 129. For example, the
parking problems could be handled by strict enforcement of the parking and towing regula-
tions; environmental problems, particularly dune damage, could be addressed through care-
fully drawn and strictly enforced laws. Id. However, the court considered the alternatives
"to be ineffective in dealing with the multifaceted situation created by the increased popu-
larity of nude bathing." Id. Under intermediate review, unlike strict scrutiny, the govern-
ment need not exhaust all lesser restrictive alternatives. Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 807.
141. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. at 129; see Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 805-06 (environmental
problems included gouges to dune tops, cuts into the dune slope, and injury to vegetation on
the dunes).
142. See supra note 137.
143. Id.
144. Kleppe, 539 F.2d at 807. The court held that plaintiffs would prevail only if the
interest in nude sunbathing was considered fundamental. Id.; see also note 122 and accom-
panying text (stating that if the liberty falls within the protection of the first amendment,
then the standard of review is higher, and thus, the state's interest in prohibiting the liberty
interest in nude sunbathing must be compelling). But cf. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1284 (the
length of one's hair is not a fundamental interest; nevertheless, the'personal liberty interest
still outweighed the government's interest in school discipline).
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pearance encompasses the right to sunbathe in the nude. 14 5 Once
established, this liberty interest in nude sunbathing must be
weighed against the state's legitimate interest in the ordinance. In
evaluating the competing interests, the court should consider the
three factors articulated in Richards v. Thurston.146 Under this in-
termediate level of scrutiny, the local ordinance will fall if it does
not bear a real or substantial relationship to the state's objectives.
Plaintiffs should attempt to characterize nude sunbathing as a pro-
tected liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment due to the
fact that there is some federal authority supporting such a charac-
terization. The most difficult aspect of this particular basis for con-
stitutional challenge will be showing that the liberty interest out-
weighs the particular state interest involved. Potential challengers
of local ordinances banning nude sunbathing must recognize that
similar arguments have not yet been successful in the federal
courts.
III. PROCEDURAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
As to procedural challenges, the plaintiff can allege that the local
ordinance is either vague or overbroad. The "void for vagueness
doctrine"'147 would suggest that, as applied to plaintiffs, the ordi-
nance is vague insofar as the plaintiffs did not receive fair warning
that their conduct-nude sunbathing-was prohibited by the
law. 48 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, alleges that
the legislation is overly broad in scope because it prohibits conduct
of third parties who are not presently before the court and whose
conduct is otherwise protected.
145. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
146. 424 F.2d at 1285; see also supra note 138.
147. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
148. See South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 611 (11th Cir.
1984), af'g in part, 548 F. Supp. 53, 57-59 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (challenging as vague the terms
"naked or insufficiently clothed to prevent improper exposure of (one's) person," "corrupts
the public morals," "outrages the sense of public decency," "nudity," "indecent," "lewd,"
and "provided or set apart for that purpose"); NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 13 (chal-
lenging the vagueness of the terms "public," "in a public place," "in a place open to the
public," and "open to public view"). For the specific wording of the statutes challenged in
South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. as unconstitutionally vague, see South Fla. Free Beaches,
Inc., 734 F.2d at 609 nn.1-3; Chapin, 457 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) (challenging




The first procedural challenge to local ordinances is that these
ordinances are unconstitutionally vague under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 49 The due process guarantee
of the Constitution requires that legislation be struck down for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.150 "Void for
vagueness" simply means that criminal penalties should not attach
where one could not reasonably understand that his or her conduct
was prohibited. 5' It is important to note that the plaintiff must
show that the statute is vague as applied to him. 5 2 That is, if a
statute clearly applies to one's own conduct, then that person can-
not successfully challenge the statute as being vague as to him;'5
3
nor can that person challenge the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others. 5 4
The United States Supreme Court has articulated three stan-
dards with which to evaluate a vagueness challenge. First, the law
must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable oppor-
tunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accord-
ingly.' 1 55 Second, the law must provide explicit standards for those
149. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (city's anti-noise ordinance
was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(breach of peace ordinance held unconstitutionally vague since the ordinance, as construed,
permitted persons to be punished for merely expressing unpopular views).
150. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (upholding Lobbying Act since it
was not too vague and indefinite to meet due process requirements).
151. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 753-58 (1974) (Uniform Code of Military Justice, which
authorized court-martial for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen, was not un-
constitutionally vague or facially invalid because of overbreadth); cf. infra note 177 and
accompanying text. In an overbreadth analysis, a plaintiff may challenge a statute that ar-
guably infringes on a constitutionally protected activity, whether or not the statute actually
does infringe on the plaintiff's activity.
152. Parker, 417 U.S. at 756.
153. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
495 (1982) (Court should examine the complainant's own conduct prior to analyzing other
hypothetical applications of the law).
154. Id. at 498; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (1972); Parker, 417 U.S. at 774-75 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
155. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; see also Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498
(quoting the standards outlined in Grayned); Parker, 417 U.S. at 774 (vague statutes fail to
provide fair notice of precisely what acts are forbidden). This standard presumes that a
person is able to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
Furthermore, vague laws may trap the innocent person by failing to provide adequate warn-
ing of the prohibition. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162
(1972); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278 (1961); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S.
612, 617 (1954).
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who are applying the law. 156 Third, and perhaps the most impor-
tant factor, the law must not threaten to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally protected first amendment rights. 157
The strictness with which these standards are applied depends
upon the relative degree of vagueness attributed to the legislation
in question. 58 For example, economic regulation is usually sub-
jected to-a less strict vagueness test;15 9 whereas legislation that
touches upon constitutional rights is subjected to a more stringent
vagueness test.6 0
Even when the stricter vagueness test has been applied, local or-
dinances banning nude sunbathing have not been held unconstitu-
tionally vague.' 6' In Chapin v. Town of Southampton, the munici-
pal ordinance prohibiting nude sunbathing was challenged as
unconstitutionally vague on the grounds that the law failed to de-
fine such terms as "nude" and "suitable dress."'6 2 The court held
that, although such terms may be unclear, they were nevertheless
clear when applied to plaintiffs' own conduct.163 Furthermore, the
court noted that "only one entrapped by vagueness may raise that
156. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; see also Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498;
Parker, 417 U.S. at 775 (vague statutes offend due process by failing to provide explicit
standards for those who enforce the laws). The second standard was intended to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the laws. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; see, e.g.,
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). "A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 575 (1974) (Massachusetts' flag misuse statute was void for vagueness).
157. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (if the law interferes with the right of
free speech or association, then a more stringent vagueness standard should apply); see also
Smith, 415 U.S. at 572-73 (when a statute reaches first amendment expression, the void for
vagueness doctrine requires a greater degree of specificity than in other instances). See gen-
erally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
75-85 (1960).
158. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
159. Id. Economic legislation is subjected to a less strict vagueness standard because its
subject matter is often more narrow and because businesses can be expected to consult rele-
vant legislation in advance of action. Id.; see also Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; United
States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); cf. Smith, 415 U.S. at 574.
160. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d 608; Chapin, 457 F. Supp. 1170.
But cf. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 53 (district court found disorderly con-
duct portion of statute unconstitutionally broad); Chapin, 457 F. Supp. at 1176-77 (statute
held overbroad but not vague).
162. Chapin, 457 F. Supp. at 1176.
163. Id.; see supra note 151 and accompanying text (void for vagueness is an "as applied"
test).
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constitutional objection."'16 4 In discussing the void for vagueness
doctrine the court stated that inherently vague terms may be made
constitutionally sound by reasonable construction of the statute.0 5
In South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami,166 the
plaintiffs challenged the statute as being so vague that a reasona-
ble person could not conform his behavior to the ordinances. 6 7
The court held, however, that the term "naked" was perfectly clear
to anyone of reasonable intelligence. The court conceded that some
terms of the statute may be vague in the abstract; nevertheless
they were clear as applied to public nudity and nude sunbathing. 168
The court concluded that even if the language of the statute was
not as clear as constitutionally desired, it was sufficiently definitive
to survive a vagueness challenge since it gave the plaintiffs fair
warning that their conduct-nude sunbathing-was prohibited. 6 9
164. Chapin, 457 F. Supp. at 1176 (citing Parker, 417 U.S. at 753-58).
165. Id. The Chapin court, quoting Harris, held that-
If the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its
terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague even though marginal cases could
be put where doubts might arise .... And if this general class of offenses can be
made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, this Court
is under a duty to give the statute that construction.
Id. (quoting Harris, 347 U.S. at 618).
166. 734 F.2d 608.
167. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 548 F. Supp. at 57.
168. Id.; see also United States v. Hymans, 463 F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir. 1972) ("indecent
conduct" is not unconstitutionally vague since it does give fair notice of the type of conduct
forbidden by the law). The Virginia Supreme Court found that a city ordinance prohibiting
common law indecent exposure was not vague or overbroad as applied. Wicks v. City of
Charlottesville, 215 Va. 274, 208 S.E.2d 752 (1974).
169. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 548 F. Supp. at 59. Even though terms such as "pub-
lic decency" and "public morals" are not specifically defined by society, a person of reasona-
ble intelligence would understand the law to prohibit nudity on public beaches. Id. In Har-
ris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), holding that fair notice is the key in holding a law void for
vagueness, the Court stated:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated con-
duct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to
be proscribed.
Id. at 617.
Cf. Coates, 402 U.S. 611 (ordinance making it a crime for two or more persons to assemble
on a sidewalk and annoy passersby). The Court in Coates declared the criminal provision
void for vagueness, not because it "requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise
but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct
is specified at all." Id. at 614. The Court also found that enforcement depended on the
subjective standard of "annoyance." Id.; see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (both cases declaring ordinances void for
vagueness).
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In Virginia, recent challenges have been leveled against local or-
dinances alleging that terms such as "in the public place" and
"open to the public view" are inherently vague. To successfully
challenge these local ordinances as unconstitutionally vague, plain-
tiffs must show that the ordinances did not give them fair notice
that nude sunbathing was prohibited in particular areas. Yet, the
courts have thus far not been favorably disposed to declare nude
sunbathing laws unconstitutionally vague.
B. Overbreadth
The second procedural challenge to a local ordinance is the claim
that the particular ordinance is overly broad. A statute is over-
broad and violative of the first amendment when it burdens more
first amendment guarantees than is necessary to protect the com-
pelling state interest.
Generally, a person cannot challenge a statute on the grounds
that it is overbroad and might conceivably be unconstitutionally
applied to third parties not presently before the court if the legis-
lation is constitutional as applied to that plaintiff.170 This principle
reflects the personal nature of constitutional rights17 1 as well as the
prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication.1 2 The first
amendment overbreadth doctrine is, however, an exception to the
accepted rule that constitutional rights are personal and cannot be
asserted vicariously.17 3 In formulating the overbreadth doctrine,
170. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); see also Members of City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-98 (1984); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
767 (1982); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). Compare the overbreadth doc-
trine, infra notes 171-87 and accompanying text, with the void for vagueness doctrine, supra
notes 148-69 and accompanying text.
171. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961)
(constitutional rights cannot be asserted vicariously).
172. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767. The U.S. Constitution also limits the federal courts' jurisdic-
tion to actual cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767
n.20.
173. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12; see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767. The Court has in the
past recognized exceptions to the principle that constitutional rights are personal, but only
because of "weighty countervailing policies." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611. One such recog-
nized exception "is where individuals not parties to a particular suit stand to lose by its
outcome and yet have no effective avenue of preserving their right themselves." Id. (citing
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
The other exception is the first amendment overbreadth doctrine:
It has long been recognized that the first amendment needs breathing space and
that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of first amendment rights
must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a par-
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the United States Supreme Court recognized an exception for laws
that are broadly written and which may inhibit constitutionally
protected expression by third parties. 17 4 This exception is predi-
cated on "a judicial prediction or assumption that the statutes'
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression. '1 7 In short,
these overly broad statutes may serve as a deterrent to the free
flow of protected expression, since third parties fearing criminal
sanctions may refrain from exercising their right of expression.17 6
Consequently, litigants may be permitted to challenge a statute as
overbroad not because their own rights of free expression have
been violated, but rather because of the chilling effect that overly
broad legislation has on first amendment freedom of expression.17 7
However, the court has drawn a distinction between statutes which
regulate conduct and those which regulate "pure speech.' 7 Gen-
erally, the overbreadth scrutiny is less rigid when statutes regulat-
ing conduct, as opposed to speech, are challenged as overly
broad.179
ticular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12 (citations omitted).
Consequently, the Court has altered its rules of standing to permit "attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity." Id.
at 612 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). See generally Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970).
174. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798. The overbreadth doctrine originated in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (very existence of some broadly written
statutes may deter free expression and should be challenged even by a party whose own
conduct may be unprotected). See generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. CT. REV. 1,
10-14 (1981).
Overbreadth claims have been asserted in cases involving statutes which regulate "only
spoken words." See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (harm to society in
allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that pro-
tected speech of others may be muted). Overbreadth challenges have also been permitted
when rights of associations were burdened. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967). Furthermore, overbreadth claims have been allowed where statutes purport
to regulate time, place, or manner of expression or communicative conduct. See, e.g.,
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972).
175. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612; see also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800. The
overbreadth doctrine is predicated on the sensitive nature of protected expression. Ferber,
458 U.S. at 768-69.
176. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634
(1980); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521.
177. See Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (quot-
ing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612).
178. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. See generally Bogen, First
Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 M. L. REv. 679, 712-14 (1978).
179. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 614-15. But see id. at 630-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
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The United States Supreme Court has been cognizant of the
overbreadth doctrine as a powerful tool and has sparingly em-
ployed the doctrine only as a last resort.' 80 Consequently, the al-
leged overbreadth of a challenged ordinance must be substantial
before the legislation will be struck down.18 Although substantial
overbreadth is not easily reduced to an exact definition, "there
must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties
not before the Court.' 8 2
The overbreadth doctrine, in contrast to a vagueness chal-
lenge, 8 ' has met with somewhat greater success in the federal
courts.184 In Chapin, the court found that the local ordinance not
only prohibited nudity, but also prohibited anything other than
"suitable bathing dress" on public beaches. The court determined
that the requirement of "suitable bathing dress" unduly restricted
the liberty interest of persons to wear expressive clothing on public
beaches and, therefore, that it was unconstitutionally overbroad. 5'
Court fails to explain why conduct should be viewed differently from speech in an over-
breadth analysis. Artificial distinctions should not be drawn between protected speech and
conduct in analyzing an overbroad statute's chilling or deterrent effect on freedom of ex-
pression. Id.
180. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769.
181. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 (overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting con-
struction could have been placed on the challenged statute). Furthermore, overbreadth
claims have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are applied to
protected conduct. See, e.g., id.; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973) (substan-
tial overbreadth is criterion used by courts in analyzing an overbreadth challenge).
182. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801 (some conceivably impermissible application
of a statute is not enough to make it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge); see also
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 964-95 ("substantial overbreadth" is criterion the Court
uses to avoid striking down a statute because of the possibility that it might be applied in
an unconstitutional manner); Cleanup '84 v. Heinrich, 759 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985) (stat-
ute prohibiting solicitation of -signatures on petitions within 100 yards of polling place on
election day was overbroad).
183. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
184. The Naturists are challenging Accomack's county statute as overbroad since it pro-
hibits all "states of nudity." NCN's Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
185. Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170, 1176-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
("nudity" was not overbroad since prohibiting nudity on public beaches is restriction on
"place" rather than a total ban on nudity); cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 209 (1975) (striking down local ordinance prohibiting the showing of films containing
nudity by drive-in theater when its screen was visible from public street). But see South
Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 548 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D. Fla. 1982) ("insufficiently
clothed to prevent improper exposure of his person" was not unconstitutionally overbroad),
vacated in part, aff'd in part, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 1984). The appellants argued that the
legislation was arbitrary since it prohibited all nudity-even artistic and cultural exhibi-
NUDE SUNBATHING
Likewise, the federal district court in South Florida Free Beaches
found the state's disorderly conduct statute, which prohibited con-
duct that "corrupt[ed] the public morals, or outrage[d] the sense
of public decency," to be overbroad.' s The court reasoned that the
statute prohibited other types of protected conduct in addition to
nude sunbathing, which it held was unprotected. For example, the
court analogized that to some people the performance of religious
rituals in public by members of an unpopular religious cult might
be characterized as "corrupting the public morals;" yet such reli-
gious conduct would clearly be within the protected liberties of the
Constitution. 187 In National Capital Naturist, plaintiffs challeng-
ing a local Virginia ordinance which bans nudity on public beaches
have included an overbreadth claim in their complaint, arguing
that such terms as "all states of nudity" are unconstitutionally
overbroad. In order to succeed on this overbreadth claim, the
plaintiffs need to prove that the legislation is substantially over-
broad and burdens more first amendment guarantees than is nec-
essary to protect the state's compelling interest in prohibiting nude
sunbathing on public beaches. Furthermore, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that there is a real danger of significantly compromis-
ing protected rights of free expression. The local ordinaffce must
be found to be substantially overbroad before it is struck down;
but the courts have been more likely to invalidate an ordinance
due to overbreadth than for vagueness.
IV. CONCLUSION
In challenging a local ordinance which prohibits nude sun-
bathing, the plaintiffs will have to prove that nude sunbathing is
communicative in nature or that nude sunbathers gather together
for associational purposes in order for their conduct to be entitled
to first amendment protection. Thus far, the courts' only rationale
for refusing to extend constitutional protection to nude sunbathing
has been based on the individualistic and nonassociational charac-
teristics of nude sunbathing. If the plaintiffs can demonstrate that
tions. Appellant's Brief at 29, South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d at 608.
186. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 548 F. Supp. at 60-61 (although declared overbroad,
the entire statute was not struck down since the unconstitutional portion was severable
from the rest). But see South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 734 F.2d at 611-12 (since plaintiffs
would still not be entitled to the relief sought-a declaration that nude sunbathing is consti-
tutionally protected-the circuit court, on appeal, declined to address the plaintiffs' over-
breadth claims).
187. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc., 548 F. Supp. at 60-61.
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nude sunbathing is a vehicle for communicating ideas, the court
will be faced with greater difficulty in denying constitutional pro-
tection to nude sunbathing. Nevertheless, even if plaintiffs can
demonstrate the expressive and associational nature of nude sun-
bathing, the courts may still find other bases for denying constitu-
tional protection to nude sunbathing. Although not yet raised in
connection with nude sunbathing, the courts may find that such
conduct violates general and traditional ideas of decency and
morals within our Constitution. Consequently, the rights of the
greater majority of people not desiring nude sunbathing may out-
weigh the protected right of the minority which seeks to sunbathe
in the nude.
